

# Equitable Distribution of Teachers: The Challenge for States

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States must look at percent of teachers who are:

- Highly qualified
- Experienced
- Out-of-field

across student concentrations of:

- Minority
- Poverty

# Teacher turnover hurts poor and minority students



<b>Teachers retained by percent:</b>	<b>Correlation between teacher retention and student populations of schools</b>
Poverty	<b>-0.09</b>
White students	<b>0.32</b>
African American students	<b>-0.33</b>
Hispanic students	<b>-0.03</b>

Source: Plecki, et.al. (2005) Teacher Retention and Mobility.

# Teacher turnover hurts poor and minority students



	<b>Percent poverty</b>	<b>Percent minority</b>
Schools retaining more than 70% of teachers in five years	26%	44%
Schools retaining fewer than 30% of teachers in five years	65%	78%

Source: Plecki, et.al. (2005) Teacher Retention and Mobility.

## Differences in teacher applicant pool



Surveys suggest number of applicants per opening vary across schools

High Poverty Neighborhoods		Wealthy Neighborhoods	
School #1	3	School #1	150
School #2	2	School #2	80
School #3	1	School #3	N/A

Source: Roza, M. and Hill, P. (2004). How Within-District Spending Inequities Help Some Schools to Fail. *Brookings Papers on Education Policy*. 2004, pp. 201-218.

# Teacher salaries within districts favor wealthier, white students



## Salary gap between top and bottom quartiles of percent:

District	<i>Poverty</i>	<i>Minority</i>
Sacramento	\$4,846	\$5,660
San Diego	\$4,187	\$4,810
San Jose Unified	\$4,008	\$4,471
San Francisco	\$2,247	\$5,958

Source: EdTrust West (2005). California's Hidden Teacher Spending Gap.

# Cannot assume equity within schools either



**When minority or poor students disproportionately take some classes, and those classes are disproportionately taught by inexperienced teachers, the same inequities occur within schools**

<b>High school courses</b>	<b>Average teacher salary</b>
All remedial math courses	<b>\$42,054</b>
Calculus, AP or Honors math courses	<b>\$47,864</b>

Source: CRPE analysis of Schools and Staffing Survey, 2006

# Understanding the problem

Uneven  
distribution of  
teachers  
across schools  
with different  
concentrations  
of minority or  
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
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# Understanding the problem

Uneven applicants across schools (or subjects)



Uneven balance of incentives (job versus reward) across teaching posts

Faulty recruiting hiring efforts at some schools


Geographic isolation inhibits access to traditional labor market



Uneven distribution of teachers across schools with different concentrations of minority or poor students

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
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


Uneven balance of incentives (job versus reward) across teaching posts

Faulty recruiting hiring efforts at some schools

Geographic isolation inhibits access to traditional labor market

Uneven turnover among schools



Where teachers are disproportionately transferring to other schools, the incentives to stay (job versus reward) are uneven across schools

Where teachers are disproportionately exiting teaching, the incentives to stay are inadequate compared to those in alternate fields



Uneven distribution of teachers across schools with different concentrations of minority or poor students

# Forces for Teacher Mal-Distribution



1. Uniform salary schedule independent of job placement or performance
2. Teacher placement driven by teacher choice
3. Differences in job challenges, school desirability (i.e. incentives)
4. Seniority provisions in labor contracts
5. Finance structures that distribute staff FTE's instead of real costs
6. Desire for each school to have the flexibility to hire the best teachers available.
7. Geographic isolation limits some applicant pools

■ **Across-the-board strategies don't address mal-distribution**

- Teacher licensing reforms, changes in recruitment
- Base salary increases for all teachers
- Large scale professional development
- Teacher mentoring/induction programs

■ **Efforts must be targeted to specific schools to address imbalance.**

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<b>1a. Incentives to attract teachers to some schools</b>	
<b>1b. Incentives to retain teachers to some schools</b>	
<b>2. Redesign job responsibilities</b>	

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## Measuring means of progress



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